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I. INTRODUCTION
Skeptical people often make the mistake of thinking that
international affairs in general, and arms control matters in
particular, are solely questions of policy, not law. They assert that
the great public issues of the day are considered and resolved
entirely on high political grounds, with national leaders acting in
calculated pursuit of raw national interests-and law is added, if at
all, as an afterthought, a makeweight in formal deliberations, or a
post hoc "cover" for actions truly undertaken for other reasons.
This colloquial perspective neglects a host of compelling
questions-including the conundrum of whether there can be, at
core, any meaningful distinction between the notions of "law,"
"policy," "morality," and the like'-but as with all good public myths,
it contains a grain of truth. Too many crucial international decisions
are still undertaken with insufficient attention to the dictates of
binding international obligations; too many wanton violations of
international order and justice survive unpunished; and too many
national leaders behave with unwarranted ignorance of the long-
term implications of their lawless behaviors.
But international law is more than just an ephemeral debating
point. In disarmament, as in other salient aspects of international
life, law has meaning and impact. It guides behaviors, shapes
expectations, undergirds notions of appropriateness and legitimacy,
and, in the extreme, provides at least an imperfect collective format
for redress of violations and other grievances. In the area of arms
non-proliferation, in particular, law can be one of the sinews that
binds the community of nations, contributing valuably to the overall
effort to retard the spread of dangerous weaponry.
This essay is about the power of the international law of non-
proliferation-its mounting power in the world today and its
properly augmented power in an enlightened future. The article
focuses on three primary areas in which international law may play
a greater role than is commonly appreciated in affecting the
behavior of potential proliferators, their suppliers, and their resolute
opponents. The three topics-areas in which the essay pleads for law
to be taken even more seriously, and by a wider audience of
governments and the international public-are: (a) treaties
(especially the provisions of those treaties that commit the parties to
pursue further incremental measures of disarmament); (b)
1. See, e.g., W. Michael Reisman, Law from the Policy Perspective, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS: A SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 1 (Myres McDougal & W. Michael Reisman eds., 1981).
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customary international law (especially those aspects of behavior-
based jurisprudence which provide unwritten, but nevertheless
binding, constraints upon the preparation for and conduct of state
violence); and (c) disarmament institutions (especially those novel
multilateral organizations that have recently sprung up to play a
variety of fact-finding, confidence-building, and dispute-resolution
functions).
In all of this, the core notion is the suggestion that international
law works, and that it would work even better if more people would
notice it and come to understand how lawfulness advances their own
self-interest. Louis Henkin's observation that "almost all nations
observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of
their obligations almost all of the time"2 is still true today (and
parenthetically is also about as strong a statement as one could
realistically support for compliance with most domestic American
legal standards). As Burns Weston has noted, every day vehicles ply
the highways and the oceans in international commerce, electronic
impulses pierce the ether in international communications, and
capital surges to exploit new opportunities in international finance. 3
Law alone can hardly claim all the credit for this commercial
symbiosis, but it does help shape and sustain the framework of
people and institutions that makes it all feasible. The international
law of non-proliferation can and should now aspire to similar
coverage and impact in safeguarding the modern world.
People around the planet already act as if they believe
international law matters. States generally try to position themselves
on the high side of a jurisprudential controversy, offering rhetorical
justifications that can serve to legitimate their arguments-and
sometimes they actually change their policies in order to conform to
the dictates of the international community. In the midst of the
confrontation with Iraq, for example, the Bush administration
regularly cited international law as a primary explanation for
American participation:4 one of the principal reasons why we were
2. Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979).
3. Burns H. Weston, Law and Alternative Security: Toward a Just World Peace, in
ALTERNATIVE SECURITY: LIVING WITHOUT NUCLEAR DETERRENCE 78, 80 (Burns H.
Weston ed., 1990).
4. In press conferences and speeches, President Bush frequently invoked notions
of international law to condemn the Iraqi aggression and explain the American and
coalition responses. See Transcript of News Session by Bush and 2 Officials on
Mideast, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1990, at A16; Mideast Tensions: Excerpts From Bush's
Remarks on His Order to Enlarge U.S. Gulf Force, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 9, 1990, at A12;
Exchange With Reporters on the Persian Gulf Crisis, 26 WKLY. COAIP. PRES. DOC. 1709,
1710 (1990); The President's News Conference, 26 WKLY. COMP. PRES. Doc. 1257,
1257-1258 (1990).
360 TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol.2:357
engaged in hostilities was to uphold the rule of law enshrined in the
Charter of the United Nations. 5 The Bush administration seems
generally to have attempted-albeit, with incomplete success 6-to
initiate and conduct those hostilities in conformity with relevant
international law strictures;7 at least the government said that
pursuit of a "new world order," based upon newfound respect for
international law, was an important consideration.8
Today, the world has a new opportunity to reconfigure, or at least
to reconceptualize, global politics, affording us a second chance to
avoid repeating-in a new, even more hazardous milieu-some of
the security errors of previous generations. During the depths of the
Cold War, the United States routinely invoked legal trappings and
vocabulary in grappling with the Soviet Union, but even the
protagonists never took this assertion of international law quite
seriously. For example, American leaders in the early 1980s began
issuing annual "compliance reports," 9 which detailed allegations of
perfidious Soviet behavior relative to sequential arms control
accords, and they routinely averred that unresolved violations of
these treaties were an exceptionally grave matter, calling into
5. U.N. CHARTER, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031. Of course, the U.S. government was
not nearly so solicitous of U.N. opinion in previous, less globally popular military
incursions, such as the invasions of Panama or Grenada. Even there, however,
American diplomats attempted to argue that the actions were justified under various
doctrines permitting the unilateral use of force-seeking to shelter the United States
actions under the rubric of legality. Ved P. Nanda, The Validity of United States
Intervention in Panama under International Law, 84 AM. J. INTL L. 494 (1990); Stuart
Taylor, Jr., Legal Basis for Invasion, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1983, at A22.
6. Richard Homan, Report Says U.S.-Led Air Campaign Against Iraq Violated
"Laws of War," WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 1991, at A37; Patrick J. Sloyan, Army Said to
Plow Under Possibly Thousands of Iraqi Soldiers in Trenches, WASH. POST, Sept. 12,
1991, at A9.
7. Some have argued that the initiation of the sanctions and the fighting against
Iraq did not conform properly to United Nations standards, as the United States
manipulated the proceedings, merely going through the motions of Security Council
consideration while threatening unilateral action if the coalition members did not
acquiesce. Burns H. Weston, Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf
Decision-Making: Precarious Legitimacy, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 516 (1991).
8. Confrontation in the Gulf- Transcript of President's address to joint session of
Congress, reprinted in N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1990, at A20 (describing the objective of a
"new world order" and asserting "today that new world is struggling to be born. A
world quite different from the one we've known. A world where the rule of law
supplants the rule of the jungle.... America and the world must support the rule of law.
And we will.").
9. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T. ST. SPEcIAL REPORT No. 122, Soviet Noncompliance With
Arms Control Agreements, Feb. 1, 1985. This type of compliance report has now
become an annual event, mandated by statute.
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question Soviet good faith and jeopardizing prospects for success on a
wide range of collaborative efforts. 10 At the same time, however, it
was abundantly clear that these quasi-legal documents were entirely
artificial. They were in no way an attempt to fashion workable,
mutually-acceptable solutions; instead, they were part of a deliberate
effort to isolate and denigrate the Soviet Union, using treaty law as a
handy club with which to batter the "evil empire."11
Similar tactics today would have even less productive
consequences. If Iraq is to be brought back into the community of
nations, and if repetition of its disastrous aggression is to be avoided,
law will have to play a key role in creating and sustaining a
disarmament and inspection regime.12 If nuclear confrontation is to
be avoided on the Korean peninsula, 13 on the Indian subcontinent, 14
or in Latin America, 15 legal documents and processes must be
viable. If chemical weapons are to be truly eradicated from the earth,
a strict and manageable compliance mechanism will have to arise. 16
Of course politics will play a leading role in all this, but law, too, has
a function-a function too often ignored.
10. Id. at 2.
11. See Analysis of the President's Report on Soviet Noncompliance With Arms
Control Agreements, 17 ARMS CONTROL TODAY 1A (1987); Stuart D. Goldman,
Verification and Compliance: Soviet Compliance With Arms Control Agreements,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE IssuE BRIEF, June 9, 1989 (arguing that the
administration's compliance reports were consistently overstated or one-sided). Taking
international law seriously does, of course, include careful monitoring of arms control
agreements, and faithful adherance by all parties is key. If the United States was truly
interested in resolving the disputes, various diplomatic approaches might have been
attempted; however, this was manifestly not what the Administration pursued.
12. See George Leopold, U.N. Inspections Lift Verification Role, DEF. NEws, May 4-
10, 1992, at 9-10 (intrusive inspections are necessary to root out Iraqi weapons of mass
destruction).
13. See David E. Sanger, North Korea Reveals Nuclear Sites to Atomic Agency,
N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1992, at A8 (national reports and international inspections may
unwrap mystery surrounding North Korean nuclear weapons programs).
14. See Sanjoy Hazarika, Moscow Affirms Sale of Technology to India, N.Y. TIMES,
May 7, 1992, at A7 (transfers of weapons-related technology threaten to exacerbate
India-Pakistan tensions and weapons competition).
15. See Gary Marx, S. American Nuclear Threat Fades, CHI. TRIB., May 3, 1992, at
C21 (Argentina and Brazil have signed treaties to terminate their incipient nuclear
arms race).
16. See Lee Feinstein, Australia Offers New Draft Treaty at Chemical Weapons
Negotiations, 22 ARMS CONTROL TODAY 20 (1992) (new verification proposals might
help permit conclusion of a chemical weapons ban).
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II. TAKING DISARMAMENT TREATIES SERIOUSLY
The first step in elevating international law is to place greater
emphasis upon solemn treaty commitments. Disarmament
agreements are the clearest, most reliable and visible form of state
assent to the creation of a safer world. Their words should be
scrutinized with care, and their obligations should be enforced, not
casually dismissed as merely vague or aspirational.
Obviously, the primary effect of most disarmament accords lies
in the substantive regulation of weaponry. 17 Specified categories of
arms may be banned outright18 or, more frequently, limited in
number, 19 and their deployment 2° or use21 may be circumscribed.
Verification arrangements in support of these substantive bans often
consume a disproportionate share of the negotiators' time and text,22
17. Some agreements are designed as "confidence-building measures," enhancing
the "transparency" of countries' military structures (via devices such as notifications of
maneuvers or invitations for inspection) and easing the fears about a possible surprise
attack, even without reducing the sides' military forces. See, e.g., Document of the
Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and
Disarmament in Europe, Sept. 19, 1986, reprinted in UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL
AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS: TEXTS
AND HISTORIES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS 319, 323 (1990) [hereinafter ACDA TREATY
BOOK]; Treaty on Open Skies, Mar. 24, 1992 (on file with Transnational Law &
Contemporary Problems) [hereinafter Open Skies Treaty].
18. See, e.g., Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their
Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583 [hereinafter Biological Weapons Convention
or BWC] (prohibits virtually all offensive activity regarding germ warfare).
19. See, e.g., Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, June 18, 1979,
U.S.-U.S.S.R., 18 I.L.M. 1112 [hereinafter SALT II Treaty] (not in force) (under which
each side would have been permitted to retain a fixed number of nuclear weapons in
several categories, reducing their total armaments).
20. See, e.g., Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26,
1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435 [hereinafter ABM Treaty] (permitted each side no
more than two anti-ballistic missile sites, each of which could include no more than 100
interceptor missiles).
21. See, e.g., Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925,
26 U.S.T. 571 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol] (prohibits the use in war of chemical
weaponry).
22. See, e.g., Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,
U.S.-U.S.S.R., July 31, 1991 [hereinafter START Treaty] (not in force) (where the
substantive arms control provisions are stated succinctly, but where the associated
inspection provisions, dismantling arrangements, data accounting procedures, and the
like required great elaboration).
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but the underlying obligations mandating arms limitation constitute
the main rationale for the agreement and the principal advantage
for global security.
In addition to this immediate weapons limitation impact,
however, several modern arms control accords have also come to
fulfill an important subsidiary role, worthy of greater attention.
These treaties deliberately contribute to the long-term growth of
international security by helping to establish and entrench "the
arms control process," defined as a regularized, ongoing
phenomenon through which the major military powers commit
themselves to the institutionalization of disarmament proceedings,
conveying reciprocal promises to pursue even further measures of
weapons regulation over time. Although little noticed, these
commitments already have played a significant role in generating
additional negotiations, in driving the parties to further diplomatic
exchanges, and in promoting a more constructive, amicable
"detente" relationship across a broad range of issues.23
Four examples help illustrate the pattern of these treaty
commitments and the role they play in shaping international
diplomacy. Each merits review.
A. Nuclear Testing
Most leading states of the world have long adhered to the view
that a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) would be enormously
valuable in regulating the proliferation of nuclear arms and in
checking the superpowers' "qualitative" arms race. 24 Nevertheless,
it has so far proven possible to approach this ultimate goal only
incrementally, in a sequence of step-by-step advances, each
imposing only partial constraints upon nuclear testing.
23. On the other hand, some observers argued that throughout the Cold War
period, the United States and Soviet Union cynically used these partial measures of
arms control to protect their planned weapons programs, to evade real efforts at
disarmament, and to perpetuate their shared global hegemony. ALvA MYRDAL, THE
GAME OF DISARMAMENT: How THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA RUN THE ARMS RACE xi-
xxdv (rev. ed., 1982).
24. PHILIP G. SCHRAG, GLOBAL ACTION: NUCLEAR TEST BAN DIPLOMACY AT THE
END OF THE COLD WAR 7-31 (1992); INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION, TOWARD A
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR WARHEAD TEST BAN 3-11 (1991). Proponents assert that a
CTBT would promote security in two ways: by inhibiting additional states who might
otherwise attempt to develop nuclear weapons (a country might not need explosive
tests in order to develop a crude fission "atomic" bomb, but would require testing to be
confident about any more sophisticated weapons such as a fusion "hydrogen" bomb);
and by complicating any efforts by the states that already possess nuclear weapons to
develop additional, more advanced types of devices (the "qualitative" arms race).
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The Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) of 196325 was the first such
step, confining nuclear explosions to deep underground locations,
where the radioactivity and other effects would not disturb the
biosphere. 26 Dissatisfied with their inability to get closer to a CTBT,
the parties declared in the LTBT preamble that they were "[s]eeking
to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear
weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this
end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man's
environment by radioactive substances." 27
In addition, in article I of the LTBT, immediately after stating
the substantive bans against testing in the atmosphere, in outer
space or under water, the parties stated,
It is understood in this connection that the provisions of this
subparagraph are without prejudice to the conclusion of a
treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear test
explosions, including all such explosions underground, the
conclusion of which, as the Parties have stated in the
Preamble to this Treaty, they seek to achieve.28
The next contribution to this incremental progression was the
1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT),29 which regulated the size of
underground nuclear explosions, confining each test to no greater
than the equivalent of 150 kilotons of TNT. 30 There the parties
reaffirmed the commitment to pursue a CTBT, again using both the
25. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313 [hereinafter Limited Test Ban Treaty or
LTBT].
26. The United States and the Soviet Union negotiated toward a CTBT over a
period of several years, but were unable to fashion a mutually-satisfactory inspection
regime that would adequately verify compliance with a complete halt to testing.
Therefore they settled for a partial accord which would eliminate testing in the
atmosphere, in outer space, and under water, where the existing verification
capabilities were deemed sufficient. See ACDA TREATY BOOK, supra note 17, at 37-44;
SCHG, supra note 24, at 7-19.
27. LTBT, supra note 25, pmbl., para. 3.
28. Id. art. .I(b).
29. Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, July 3, 1974,
U.S.-U.S.S.R., 13 I.L.M. 907 [hereinafter Threshold Test Ban Treaty or TTBT].
30. The TTBT prohibits the full testing of nuclear weapons with very high yields,
preventing some possible twists in the strategic nuclear arms race. Many observers,
however, contended that the 150 kiloton ceiling (roughly 10 times the size of the
Hiroshima bomb) is so high that the superpowers are not, as a practical matter,
restrained from doing anything that they would otherwise elect to do. ACDA TREATY
BOOK, supra note 17, at 184-86; SCHRAG, supra note 24, at 19-23.
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preamble 31 and article 132 to express their determination to continue
their negotiations toward that end.
Since then, the United States and the former Soviet Union have
negotiated additional accords: a 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions
Treaty (PNET),33 designed to apply restrictions similar to the TTBT
in the case of nuclear explosions other than weapons tests;34 a 1990
protocol inserting additional verification arrangements into the
TTBT;35 and a companion 1990 protocol providing parallel inspection
procedures for the PNET.36
Although each of these treaties seemed to elicit the next step in
the progression, no true comprehensive nuclear test ban agreement
has yet been reached, and no bilateral or multilateral negotiations
toward such a CTBT currently are underway. 37 The Reagan
administration, after long resisting meaningful progress toward a
test ban treaty, ultimately reaffirmed CTBT as an eventual goal of
the United States. The Bush administration, however, has not made
good on the pledge to proceed with negotiations toward that end.38
31. TTBT, supra note 29, pmbl, para. 3. ("Recalling the determination expressed by
the Parties to the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in
Outer Space and Under Water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of
all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, and to continue negotiations to this
end." ). Id.
32. Id. art. 1.3 ("The Parties shall continue their negotiations with a view toward
achieving a solution to the problem of the cessation of all underground nuclear weapon
tests." )
33. Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, May 28,
1976, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 15 I.L.M. 894 [hereinafter Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty or
PNET]. The TTBT and PNET did not enter into force until 1990.
34. The PNET was a companion to the TTBT-neither could enter into force
without the other-in order to prevent a party from circumventing the TTBT's
limitations on weapons tests through the guise of a "peaceful" nuclear explosion,
allegedly undertaken for mining or civil engineering purposes. ACDA TREATY BOOK,
supra note 17, at 191-93; SCHRAG, supra note 24, at 19-23.
35. Protocol to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty on the Limitation of Underground
Nuclear Weapon Tests, June 1, 1990, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 29 T.L.M. 969 [hereinafter TTBT
Protocol].
36. Protocol to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty on Underground Nuclear
Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, June 1, 1990, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 29 I.L.M. 1025.
37. There were negotiations toward a CTBT during the Carter Administration, and
substantial areas of agreement were reached, but the parties were unable to conclude a
treaty. SCHRAG, supra note 24, at 23-27.
38. Id. at 83, 187-88; R. Jeffrey Smith, Breaking Pledge, U.S. to Defer Underground
Nuclear Test Talks, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 1990, at A24 [hereinafter Breaking Pledge].
Recently, there have been indications that the Bush Administration would be willing to
be somewhat flexible on test ban questions, and some additional limitations-but no
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What has been the consequence of this pattern of actions? The
world-led largely by the United States-has undertaken a series of
steps edging part way down the test ban path, and securing
widespread adherance. On the other hand, the world-again,
largely at the behest of the United States-has refrained from
concluding a CTBT, stopping with, at best, a miserly approach to the
legal obligations for continuing negotiations as spelled out in the
earlier documents. At the same time, the capacity to conduct
nuclear weapons test explosions has proliferated (half a dozen
additional states have de facto joined the "nuclear club" since 1963,
and others are working vigorously in that direction) 39 and the
superpowers' arms race continued (at least until very recently) with
undiminished vigor.40
It is, of course, impossible to calculate what the world would
have been like had the community been able to secure a CTBT in
conformity with the pre-existing commitments at an earlier date.
Certainly, at least some weapons programs in the superpower
countries and elsewhere, would have been choked off; others might
have found a new way to flourish. But it is increasingly clear, as
noted below, that the international political and legal consequences
of the United States' ongoing adamant refusal to continue the
accretion of testing limitations, called for in the earlier treaties,
could soon prove hazardous for the entire global non-proliferation
regime, as well as for the system of international law more
generally.
B. Chemical and Biological Weapons
The second illustration of an arms control treaty mandating
follow-on negotiations toward a more complete, ambitious or
significant successor is the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention
(BWC). 4 1 There, the negotiating parties were building upon an
international diplomatic history that had, at times, treated both
chemical and biological weapons as linked parts of a whole, so that
international negotiations-may yet emerge. R. Jeffrey Smith, Administration
Considers Limiting Nuclear Tests; Options Prepared for Bush as Summit Nears, WASH.
POST, May 25, 1992, at Al.
39. LEONARD SPECTOR, THE UNDECLARED BOMB 3-22 (1988) (surveying nuclear
weapons-related activities in several developing countries).
40. See generally RUTH SIvARD, WORLD MILITARY AND SOCIAL EXPENDITURES 1991;
UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, WORLD MILITARY
EXPENDITURES AND ARMS TRANSFERS 1990 (1991) (surveying global military
spending).
41. BWC, supra note 18.
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any disarmament accord should deal with both simultaneously.42
At other times, however, the relevant states had concluded that the
overall problem should be fractured, to permit immediate progress
on biological weapons (which were seen as having little military
utility, and were therefore relatively easy for the partisans to
surrender),43 while deferring work on chemical weapons (which, in
addition to possessing potential military value, relied upon
precursor substances widely used in the civilian chemical industry
and therefore posing severe verification hurdles).44
Eventually, the treaty drafters decided to pursue the bifurcated
approach, drafting a BW-only treaty, but including in it a
commitment to attack resolutely the other half of the problem, too.45
Therefore, in article IX, BWC parties undertook "to continue
negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement
on effective measures for the prohibition" of chemical weapons. 46
Over the intervening two decades, negotiations toward a CW accord
have proceeded fitfully in a variety of bilateral and multilateral fora,
and it now appears that the long-awaited document has finally
emerged. 47 This Chemical Weapons Convention thus satisfies the
aspirations and obligations originally expressed (and legally
adopted) in 1972.
The two decades of delay, however, have carried a substantial
price. Imperfect compliance with the legal obligations has kept the
door open for additional countries to develop and to apply chemical
42. ACDA TREATY BOOK, supra note 17, at 129-30. Biological and chemical
weapons have been closely linked in the public mind, and the 1925 Geneva Protocol
dealt with both categories of weapons. Geneva Protocol, supra note 21.
43. In 1969-three years prior to the conclusion of the BWC-President Richard
Nixon unilaterally renounced all methods of biological warfare for the United States
and ordered the dismantling of all offensive BW capabilities, independent of any
reciprocal actions by other countries. ACDA TREATY BOOK, supra note 17, at 130.
44. See VERIFICATION OF DUAL-USE CHEMICALS UNDER THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS
CONVENTION: THE CASE OF THIODIGLYCOL passim (S. Lundin ed., 1991) (many of the
chemicals that could be used to produce lethal weaponry are simultaneously essential
to a range of applications such as plastics, paints, fertilizers, and the like, so any effort to
ban the weaponry also threatens to inhibit valuable commerce).
45. ACDA TREATY BOOK, supra note 17, at 130-31.
46. BWC, supra note 18, art. IX.
47. Will Carpenter, Completing the Chemical Weapons Convention: An Industry
View, CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BULL., Mar. 1992, at 1; Raff Trapp, Into the
"End Game," CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BULL., Mar. 1992, at 21. The Chemical
Weapons Convention will be a comprehensive global ban on the production,
deployment and use of lethal chemical weapons in international hostilities. Treaty
negotiations have recently produced a final text, which was opened for signature in
early 1993.
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weapons in combat, and experts now estimate that as many as
twenty states have deployed or pursued undeclared CW arsenals. 48
The longstanding taboo against the use of CW has at least partially
eroded, and people died on both sides from exposure to chemical
ordnance during the Iran-Iraq war.49 There is, of course, no way of
knowing how world events would have unfolded had the 1972 BWC
pledge been redeemed earlier, but the negotiators at that time
thought it was important, and hoped that a prompt CW agreement
could help forestall this type of calamity. The resulting losses for
United States security-manifested most recently in the discovery of
a massive Iraqi chemical weapons industry5 0-might therefore have
been avoided.
C. Strategic Nuclear Weapons
The third example concerns strategic nuclear weaponry. Here,
too, the evolutionary progression has taken the form of a series of
partial, incomplete accords, each of which consciously pointed the
way for its successor. In the SALT I negotiations, for example, the
United States and the Soviet Union emplaced a pathbreaking set of
constraints upon both offensive and defensive weaponry, and
explicitly committed themselves "to continue active negotiations" on
deeper reductions. 51 In fact, the United States declared that if those
further reductions were not promptly forthcoming, such a failure
might jeopardize American willingness to continue adherence with
even the first phase of the controls. 52
The next round of those negotiations, therefore, produced the
1979 SALT II treaty.53 The most massive and detailed agreement
negotiated to that time, SALT II incorporated a delicate balancing of
asymmetric reductions and limitations upon the United States and
the Soviet Union. 54 Some weapons were to be drawn down
immediately, others were permitted over a longer period of time, and
48. GORDON BURCK & CHARLES FLOWERREE, INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON
CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION xx-xxi (1991).
49. Id. at 85-137.
50. Id. at 35-84.
51. ABM Treaty, supra note 20, art. XI; Interim Agreement on Certain Measures
With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, May 26, 1972, U.S.-
U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3462, art. VII [hereinaer SALT I Interim Agreement].
52. ABM Treaty, supra note 20, Unilateral Statement A; SALT I Interim
Agreement, supra note 51, Unilateral Statement A.
53. SALT II Treaty, supra note 19.
54. ACDA TREATY BOOK, supra note 17, at 261-66.
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still others were deferred to subsequent deliberations. 5 5
Consequently, the parties included in the package of treaty
documents a "Joint Statement of Principles and Guidelines for
Subsequent Negotiations on the Limitation of Strategic Arms."56 The
Joint Statement incorporated some rather general principles, such
as "equality and equal security"57 and "cooperative measures" of
verification. 58 However, there was also language clearly laying
down markers that some of the more problematic issues (such as
cruise missiles) that had been incompletely resolved in SALT II
would have to be dealt with more definitively in the next round of
talks.59
Although the SALT II Treaty never entered into force,60
subsequent negotiations, under the rubric of START,61 did proceed,
and did, mutatis mutandis, deal with the points indicated in the
Joint Statement of Principles. Deeper cuts in offensive arms,
together with coverage of the wider range of weapons types-all
circumscribed by an intrusive verification apparatus-were written
into the successor agreement, just as SALT II had forecast and
required.62
The commitment to negotiate additional treaties and deeper
reductions in strategic offensive arms has therefore been honored,
but only slowly and incompletely. In the meantime, however, the
United States and the Soviet Union both squandered their national
resources on billions of dollars worth of arms race gadgets, they
imperiled the planet with the threat of massive "overkill," and they
perpetuated a system of "mutual assured destruction" which
55. During the initial period of the treaty, each side was permitted a total of 2400
strategic weapons, and the ceiling was to be lowered to 2250 within three years. SALT
H Treaty, supra note 19, arts. 11.1 and 111.2.
56. SALT H Treaty, supra note 19, Joint Statement of Principles [hereinafter JSP].
57. Id. first para.
58. Id. second para.
59. Id. third para. This provision directed attention at the Protocol to the treaty, in
which the parties constructed an interim regime to regulate cruise missiles and mobile
ICBMs, pending a more comprehensive successor agreement.
60. After the SALT I Treaty was signed and submitted to the Senate, and while the
advice and consent process was pending, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.
President Carter then asked that the Senate defer its consideration of the treaty. He and
President Reagan both issued statements of intention to abide by the unratified
document so long as the Soviet Union reciprocated. In 1986, President Reagan
declared that the Soviets had not honored their commitment, and he abrogated
American compliance. ACDA TREATY BOOK, supra note 17, at 263.
61. START Treaty, supra note 22.
62. Id art. 11.
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contributed to the "psychic numbing" of their citizenry. 63 Greater
fidelity to their legal obligations-and better appreciation for the
strategic and economic realities underpinning them-might have
resulted in a shorter, safer, and more prosperous cold war era on all
sides.
D. Nuclear Non-Proliferation
The final, and most important, example of legally-compelled
incremental progress in arms control comes from article VI of the
1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.64 This document, widely
regarded as the keystone of the global effort to prohibit the further
spread of nuclear weapons capability,65 embraces a complex set of
tradeoffs in pursuit of security and economic growth. The non-
nuclear-weapons states (NNWS) pledge never to develop or acquire
nuclear weapons 66 and to accept international inspections to verify
compliance with that ban.67 The nuclear-weapons states (NWS)
conversely promise to refrain from assisting other states in
procuring nuclear weapons, 68 to share the peaceful and civilian
benefits of nuclear power, 69 and-most importantly in this context-
to arrest their own pursuit of nuclear arms:
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to
cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to
nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and
63. Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) is the doctrine positing that security in the
nuclear age is achieved when each side is confident that it possesses sufficient
retaliatory capability to deliver a devastating blow to its opponent, even after
absorbing an all-out surprise first attack. Under this premise, each side's civilian
population is essentially hostage to the other's nuclear prowess, a condition of
reciprocal vulnerability that has strong negative consequences for national mental
health and psychic well-being. See Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr. & Wolfgang K. H.
Panofsky, MAD Versus NUTS: Can Doctrine or Weaponry Remedy the Mutual
Hostage Relationship of the Superpowers, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 287 (1981); ROBERT J.
LIFTON & RICHARD FALK, INDEFENSIBLE WEAPONS: THE POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
CASE AGAINST NUCLEARISM 177-89 (1982).
64. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T.
483 [hereinafter NPTI.
65. Mohamed Shaker, The Nonproliferation Treaty Regime, in BEYOND 1995: THE
FUTURE OF THE NPT REGIME 7 (Joseph Pilat & Robert Pendley eds., 1990).
66. NPT, supra note 64, art. II.
67. Id. art. El.
68. Id. art. I.
69. Id. arts. IV and V.
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complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control.70
Compliance with article VI has recently become controversial
because at least some leading NNWS have adopted the view that
behind the rather generic language of the treaty lies a deeper
understanding that a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, in
particular, is mandated. 71 That is, some partisans have asserted
that despite the raft of monumental arms control accords in recent
years (limiting in dramatic fashion intermediate range weapons,
strategic arms, conventional forces in Europe, etc.), article VI will
not be satisfied until the superpowers conclude a CTBT.72
However, the United States has refused for a decade to negotiate
toward, or even talk constructively about, a CTBT. American leaders
have denied that article VI really targeted a CTBT in any special
way, and have asserted that further restrictions upon testing are not
in the national interest as long as the country depends upon nuclear
weapons as a bulwark of deterrence. 73
This issue will be joined in stark form in the coming months
because the NPT also includes a novel "renewal" article, mandating
that after the treaty has been in force for twenty-five years (i.e., in
1995), a conference of parties will be convened to decide the future of
the treaty regime. If many NNWS states are dissatisfied with the
record of United States (and other) compliance with article VI-
especially regarding the failure to produce, or even pursue, a
CTBT-then a consensual extension of the NPT could be in doubt.
The international community will therefore be plunged into a debate
about the content of article VI: what types of disarmament measures
does it really require, and what is the nature of "good faith" in such
negotiations?
The point illustrated by these four examples, is that international
law plays a role in influencing state behaviors, and, more
importantly, that it should play an even bigger role. These treaty
70. Id. art. VI.
71. See Darryl Howlett & John Simpson, The NPT and the CTBT: An Inextricable
Relationship?, Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Issue Review No.
1, Mar. 1992, at 6.
72. Under the NPT, a "review conference" convenes every five years to assess the
operation of the treaty. Two of the previous four such meetings have ended in
disarray, with the participants unable to reach consensus upon any type of joint
concluding statement. The primary reason for this anomie has been the ongoing
dispute about CTBT, with some NNWS asserting that a test ban treaty is an essential
component for satisfaction of article VI, and with the United States insisting otherwise.
SOHRAG, supra note 24, at 127-31; Howlett & Simpson, supra note 71, at 6.
73. SCHRAG, supra note 24, at 83, 187-88; Breaking Pledge, supra note 38, at 24.
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commitments to pursue additional measures of arms control-and
others could easily be added to the list of illustrations 74-are more
than hortatory. Even if imprecisely articulated or cast in rather
general, long-term vocabulary, they are part of binding international
law, and ought to be taken seriously. No one could prove that the
mandate for follow-on negotiations caused the subsequent treaties
identified above-in each instance, multiple factors were at play in
eliciting that progress. But international lawyers should not overlook
those treaty provisions, either-we should highlight them,
underscore their importance, and stress that they are binding
obligations that a law-abiding society ought to respect.
The BWC promise to conclude a chemical weapons accord should
have been honored far sooner-the world should not have had to wait
twenty years for the next meaningful step. The LTBT and TTBT
obligations to work toward a CTBT should not be dismissed as
merely aspirational-they have the force of law. The NPT article VI
language also has some teeth: a requirement to negotiate "in good
faith" may be vague, but it is not meaningless. Where a country
simply changes its mind about the feasiblity or wisdom of a treaty
commitment-even if a major power such as the United States
reverses itself on strategic doctrine-the treaty obligation still
stands, and should not be blithely evaded.
Thus the United States has, through these various arms control
agreements, voluntarily assumed a set of binding obligations under
international law to pursue further measures of weapons
regulation. Perhaps, in some instances, these undertakings were
accepted casually or cavalierly, not quite comprehending the
eventual import of the clauses. Perhaps the treaty drafters could
have exercised greater precision and clarity, implanting precise
timetables and specifying the contents of the future accords. Perhaps
the strategic situation has changed in key ways, and new military
and foreign policy approaches should now be adopted in the new
milieu. But the fundamental international law principle of pacta
sunt servanda remains, and the United States and others have
accumulated a record of, at best, partial and tardy compliance with
these commitments. Doing more than this is now required not
merely by considerations of policy and strategy, but by law.
Taking law seriously means, first of all, taking treaty obligations
seriously. Treaties are the "coin of the realm" in international
74. Other arms control treaties, too, have mandated or otherwise elicited follow-on
negotiations. See, e.g., Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear
Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor
and in the Subsoil Thereof, Feb. 11, 1971, art V, 23 U.S.T. 701; Treaty on Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe, Nov. 19, 1990, art. XVIII, 30 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter CFE Treaty].
FaIl 1992] THE JURISPRUDENCE OF NON-PROLIFERATION 373
affairs, and the international community must sustain them and
execute them in good faith, even if that might occasionally prove
disadvantageous in the short term. The United States, in particular,
has the biggest stake in the sound maintenance of treaty law: as the
most frequent instigator and participant in major treaty negotiations
across a broad range of issues, the United States has the most to lose
if this form of international communication and commitment is
debased. More than most other countries, the United States benefits
when the community underscores its commitment to international
agreements;, violating a treaty, discrediting it as vague or precatory,
or seeking to evade its impact through exploitation of alleged
loopholes would be foolishly shortsighted for our non-proliferation
concerns and for a wide range of other issues.
III. TAKING CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW SERIOUSLY
The second major source of international law is custom, focusing
upon repeated, notorious state behavior, driven by a sense of
obligation and accepted as legitimate by other participants in the
community of nations. 75 Although the centuries-old tradition of
primary reliance upon custom has been somewhat eclipsed in the
modern era by the rise of treaties,76 custom retains its vitality as a
source of law, and may even be primed for something of a
resurgence. 77
Regarding chemical weapons, for example, customary
international law still could be a major lawmaking process. The 1925
Geneva Protocol 78 expressed certain prohibitions upon the use of
chemical weapons in warfare, 79 but various limitations in that
75. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102(2) and cmt. b (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
76. The existence, content, and binding character of a norm of customary
international law may be difficult to establish. Treaties, in contrast, usually offer
clearer, more accessible evidence, and have often been used to codify or develop the
customary standards. Id. § 102(3) and cmt. i.
77. Controversy has arisen regarding the application of customary international
law in domestic disputes by courts of the United States. See Philip Trimble, A
Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665 (1986). There
is, however, little question regarding the continuing binding effect of custom as a
matter of international law. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 75, §111.
78. Geneva Protocol, supra note 21.
79. Id. first declaration. The Geneva Protocol outlawed only the use of chemical
weapons in international combat, and did not proscribe the development, production,
or deployment of chemical munitions.
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instrument80 (including many parties' entry of relatively restrictive
reservations)81 confine its direct impact. Customary international
law, in contrast, can provide a more comprehensive, global
proscription. A careful analysis of the pattern of state practice
(including reactions to the occasional departures from that pattern)
helps substantiate the view that first use of lethal chemical agents in
international combat is already per se illegal under customary
international law.82 If states and other actors in the international
scene would pay greater attention to evolving custom, they would
realize that the network of law impinging upon chemical warfare is
greater than merely the content of treaties.5 3 Even a completed
Chemical Weapons Convention will be directly binding only upon
those states that voluntarily adopt it and become parties to it, but the
overarching customary international law proscription against CW
may simultaneously obligate the entire community of nations,
affecting even the most recalcitrant treaty holdouts.8 4
In the same vein, there is a significant argument that
longstanding customary international law also has something to say
80. By its terms, the Geneva Protocol applied only to uses of chemical weapons
against other parties to the treaty. There was a sustained controversy about the treaty's
coverage of non-lethal chemical agents such as riot-control substances and herbicides.
ACDA TREATY BOOK, supra note 17, at 10-14.
81. Many parties to the Geneva Protocol formally reserved the right to retaliate
against an enemy's use of chemical weapons, effectively converting the Geneva
Protocol into a no-first-use pledge. ACDA TREATY BOOK, supra note 17, at 10.
82. See David Koplow, Long Arms and Chemical Arms: Extraterritoriality and the
Draft Chemical Weapons Convention, 15 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 19-20 (1990); Elizabeth A.
Smith, International Regulation of Chemical and Biological Weapons: 'Yellow Rain"
and Arms Control, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011, 1048.
83. It could also be argued that the first use of lethal chemical weapons in
international combat (or other particularly egregious weapons applications) would be
a violation of jus cogens, a peremptory norm of international law from which no
derogation is permitted. Such a norm supersedes even contrary principles of custom or
treaty, and is recognized as a valid source of international law. However, the notion of
jus cogens has proven ephemeral in practice, a claim assertingjus cogens is difficult to
substantiate, and no cases have been decided upon that basis. RESTATEMENT, supra
note 75, §102, cmt. k and reporters' note 6.
84. A state that consistently expresses its opposition to an emerging norm of
customary international law may be exempt from its application. By overtly
withholding its consent from the initiation of a putative rule of customary law, the
objecting state may permanently escape coverage of the rule. RESTATEMENT, supra
note 75, at § 102, cmt. d. However, no state has consistently objected to the customary
prohibitions against chemical warfare, so none would be exempt from the international
rules.
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about the legality of nuclear weapons. 85 Traditional norms of the
international law of war-such as recognition of the distinctions
between civilians and soldiers, or between belligerent states and
neutrals8 6 -require a degree of finesse and precision in the
application of force in hostilities, and it is plausible to assert that
nuclear weapons inherently ignore these subtleties. Similarly, the
well-accepted notion of "proportionality" as a criterion for the legality
of force8 7 (in the exercise of legitimate self-defense, a state may do
"nothing unreasonable or excessive")88 may automatically exclude
weapons of such massive destruction in many circumstances.
This is not the place to rehearse the arguments about the legality
vel non of nuclear weapons, or to attempt to fashion more refined
contentions differentiating "first strike weapons" from others that
might be said to play a lawful role in deterrence or defense. But it is a
suitable occasion to assert that law should be relevant to these types
of discussions. In determining whether to deploy the MX
"Peacekeeper" missile, for example, the United States should have
considered more fully the possible restraint that customary
international law might impose. In determining whether to
recognize former Soviet republics that have not yet rid themselves of
offensive nuclear weapons, the world should weigh more heavily the
impact of binding custom in arms control. In determining how to
react to covert attempts to supply chemical weapons-related
equipment, materials or technology to Libya or other "rogue" states,
the community of nations should focus more on the relevant legal
dimensions, not solely on the politics or the economics of the
transactions.
Customary international law could become an even more
substantial force in disarmament proceedings in the future for three
reasons. First, we are in an era where at least some disarmament
proposals have progressed with breakneck speed, outstripping the
negotiators' abilities to craft suitable written treaties. Consequently,
85. See FRANCIS A. BOYLE ET AL., IN RE: MORE THAN 50,000 NUCLEAR WEAPONS:
ANALYSES OF THE ILLEGALITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
passim (1991).
86. STATEMENT ON THE ILLEGALITY OF NUCLEAR WARFARE (C. David Birman ed.,
1990) (modern rules of warfare outlaw weapons or tactics that do not discriminate
between combatants and noncombatants, and between belligerent and neutral
countries).
87. Destruction of the "Caroline," 2 MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 409-
414 (1906), reprinted in BARRY E. CARTER & PHILIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
1221-23 (1991).
88. Letter from Secretary of State Daniel Webster, regarding the destruction of the
"Caroline," CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 87, at 1223.
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we see much greater reliance upon the exchange of "parallel
unilateral statements of intention" and "politically binding
commitments," through which the parties align their respective
behaviors even before they are able to reduce their mutual
understanding to satisfactory legal text.s9 In this environment, state
practice, and the words that accompany the nuanced behavior, are of
growing salience and importance. At least as a temporary measure,
state behavior-the genesis of customary international law-may
play an increasingly vital role in international affairs. As patterns of
disarmament practice endure and spread, they "harden" over time,
generating expectations, reliance, and a sense of legitimacy that
eventually accretes into law.90
Second, the modern era has witnessed a stunningly rapid
creation of new states, as former communist empires in the Soviet
Union and Yugoslavia undergo a long-delayed fission reaction.
Pursuant to standard understandings, a newly emerging state
generally must take the existing content of customary international
law as given; even if it dislikes some of the rules, and even if it had
no opportunity to participate independently in the process of creating
those proscriptions, it is too late to dissent and effectively "opt out."91
Therefore, while these new participants on the world scene do have
some high degree of autonomy and flexibility in determining which
treaties to accept and which to avoid,92 they cannot easily reject the
content and coverage of contemporary customary international law.
The more that important arms limitation understandings are
poured into the framework of international law adopted as custom,
89. For example, in October 1991 and January 1992, Presidents Bush, Gorbachev,
and Yeltsin issued dramatic statements containing not only proposals for negotiations
toward future deep cuts in nuclear weaponry but also immediate, unilateral reductions
that might prompt reciprocal restraint even before any treaty was concluded. R.
Jeffrey Smith, Bush, Yeltsin Add Momentum To Cuts in Atomic Stockpiles, WASH.
POST, Jan. 30, 1992, at A18; Serge Schmemann, Gorbachev Matches U.S. on Nuclear
Cuts and Goes Further on Strategic Warheads, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 6, 1991, at 1.
90. For example, the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures
and Disarmament in Europe developed in the "Stockholm Document," a package of
measures (advance notification of military maneuvers, invitation of foreign observers,
etc.) designed to reduce fears about a surprise attack. ACDA TREATY BOOK, supra note
17, at 319-22. Initially, these measures were only "politically binding," but their success,
and the vigor with which the participants exercised them, contributed to the
subsequent efforts to elaborate similar confidence-building provisions in the CFE
Treaty and the Open Skies Treaty. CFE Treaty, supra note 74; Open Skies Treaty,
supra note 17.
91. RESTATEMENT, supra note 75, §102, reporters' note 2.
92. John B. Rhinelander & George B. Bunn, Who's Bound by the Former Soviet
Union's Arms Control Treaties?, 21 ARMS CONTROL TODAY 3 (1991).
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the more completely the legal network will automatically embrace
these new, inexperienced entries.93
Third, there is in modern state practice something of a trend
toward regionalism, as particular corners of the globe are
indentified as having unique problems and special opportunities.
Proposals abound for creating a local "weapons free zone" or a "zone
of peace" of various sorts, 94 and some successes have already been
achieved.95 Regional custom may be easier to contemplate, too, as
like-minded states, sharing a common location, history, and
appreciation of the security situation, can align their behaviors more
readily. 96 True global consensus is often elusive, but collaboration
among a smaller group may provide a more feasible opportunity for
law to advance. For example, future efforts, sustained by custom,
may be able to preclude the introduction of selected types of advanced
weapons into a particular region, even in the absence of the
specificity, mutuality, and verifiability required to craft a treaty.97
The point is not that customary international law can solve all
the problems of weapons proliferation, but that it can play a role, and
that it could play an even greater role if the people involved would
simply notice the muse of jurisprudence, recognize the extent to
which it promotes the values of stability and peace, and embrace it
with greater regularity and fortitude. Even without treaties,
customary behavior can have an impact in confining and
moderating states-it has done so in the past, and it may prove even
more powerful in the future. Each of the world's current
troublespots presents its own thicket of dificulties, so it may prove
93. See Julie Dahlitz, The Role of Customary Law in Arms Limitation, in THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT 157-78 (Julie Dahlitz &
Detlev Dicke eds., 1991).
94. See, e.g., F6lix Calderon, Security and Arms Limitation in Latin America and
the Caribbean, infra this volume; see also entries for proposals such as Nordic Nuclear-
Weapon-Free Zone, Mediterranean Zone of Peace, and Indian Ocean as a Zone of
Peace, 11 ARMS CONTROL REP. 100.1 (1990).
95. See Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794 (demilitarizing Antarctica);
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Feb. 14, 1967, 634
U.N.T.S. 281 [hereinafter Treaty of Tlatelolco] (creating a nuclear-weapons-free zone
for Latin America).
96. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 75, §102, cmt. e (describing the evolution of
regional or special customary international law).
97. See R. Jeffrey Smith, State Department Meeting on Mideast Arms Control
Opens Without Rancor, WASH. POST, May 12, 1992, at A12 (efforts to develop at least a
partial solution to a regional arms race, even while no comprehensive settlement is yet
in sight); Knut Ipsen, Explicit Methods of Arms Control Treaty Evolution, in THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT 75-93 (Julie Dahlitz &
Detlev Dicke eds., 1991) (noting regional approaches to arms control).
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futile to attempt to resolve all of them through some grand,
generally-applicable strategy; but an ad hoc approach, treating each
case as unique and relying upon step-by-step lawmaking through
the accretion of state practice, may offer more promise.
IV. TAKING DISARMAMENT INSTITUTIONS SERIOUSLY
One of the most dramatic changes in modern arms control
agreements has been the extent to which they have spawned new,
permanent, specialized institutions 98 designed to implement the
treaties, consider improvements to them, and resolve disputes
arising under them-the creation of a sort of "peace-industrial
complex."
The 1972 SALT I negotiations were the progenitor of this
tradition, as the ABM Treaty called for the creation of a Standing
Consultative Commission (SCC) through which the parties could
regularly communicate in their effort to sustain and improve the
treaty regime. 99 When the Reagan administration, which had
roundly criticized the SCC as ineffective, concluded the 1987 INF
Treaty, it recognized that a similar institution would be valuable, but
felt constrained not to cede greater authority to the disfavored SCC.
So the INF Treaty instead created a clone, the Special Verification
Commission, with a substantially similar mandate. 10 0
Other arms control agreements have also regularly established
their own standing bodies, 10 1 almost as a matter of course in the
search for permanence and prestige:
98. Arms control and other treaties have long called for periodic review
conferences, ongoing consultations, and other episodic meetings of the parties. See, e.g.,
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques, May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333, 16 I.L.M. 88, art. V; Antarctic
Treaty, supra note 95, art. IX.
99. ABM Treaty, supra note 20, art. XIII.
100. Treaty on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range
Missiles, Dec. 8, 1987, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 27 I.L.M. 90, art. XIII.
101. The Conference on Disarmament, a Geneva-based affiliate of the United
Nations, has become the primary multilateral body for negotiating new arms control
agreements. It and its predecessor organizations assisted in the elaboration of many of
the treaty texts noted in this Article. In contrast, the implementation bodies considered
in this section are those that have been established by the various treaties to operate
and improve the applicable regime.
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* 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty: Joint
Consultative Commission; 10 2
* 1990 TTBT Protocol: Bilateral Consultative
Commission;10 3
*1990 Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty: Joint
Consultative Group;10 4
*1991 START Treaty: Joint Compliance and Inspection
Commission; 0 5
*1992 Open Skies Treaty: Open Skies Consultative
Commission; 10 6 and
* Forthcoming Chemical Weapons Convention:
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons.107
These organizations fulfill a variety of crucial roles. They serve
as the primary mechanism for exchanging information between the
parties, including notifications of routine weapons actions
(dismantlings, etc.) required by the treaty. They oversee the on-site
inspection process and the destruction of excess weapons and
facilities. They perform the "risk reduction" and "crisis
management" functions in various ways. They consider compliance
questions, exchanging inquiries and responses. They resolve
disputes-not in the sense of some independent, neutral adjudicator,
but more as a forum for ongoing negotiations and deliberations.10 8
They serve as the venue through which parties may undertake
periodic reviews as required by the treaty. They negotiate follow-on
accords or implementing arrangements needed to flesh out the day-
to-day mechanics of the treaty.
The Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), operating as an institutional arm of the NPT,
102. PNET, supra note 33, art. V.
103. 1990 TTBT Protocol, supra note 35, § XI.
104. CFE Treaty, supra note 74, art. XVI.
105. START Treaty, supra note 22, art. XV and Protocol on the Joint Compliance
and Inspection Commission.
106. Open Skies Treaty, supra note 17, art. X and Annex L.
107. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to the Conference on
Disarmament, CD/1108, August 27, 1991, app. I, art. VIII (current "rolling text" of draft
chemical weapons convention now being finalized).
108. Cf. Phillip R. Trimble, Beyond Verification: The Next Step in Arms Control,
102 HARV. L. REV. 885, 897 (1989) (proposing the establishment of a neutral,
independent international dispute resolution mechanism for arbitrating arms control
controversies).
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deserves special consideration here. Although its verification
procedures are not above reproach, 10 9 the IAEA may yet be the
prototype of a true international institution, promulgating rules that
are accepted as obligatory per se. In disseminating instructions to
member states regarding reporting and inspection procedures, the
IAEA has begun to assume a power to interpret treaties and issue
implementing directives, any violation of which would be akin to a
violation of the treaty itself. 10 An "international administrative
law," replete with some form of notice-and-comment rulemaking
procedures, may yet arise from such humble beginnings.
In all of this, the various implementing institutions create and
apply international law, and they do so in a wholly constructive and
meaningful fashion. They serve as the bricks and mortar of the
international law of arms control, and they help nudge the
community toward greater reliance upon peaceful, negotiated
settlement of problems that too often in the past exploded into
something hostile. Again, greater adherence to these organizations,
devoting still more care to their use and devolving greater authority
upon them, would have a salutory effect upon the international
system. These institutions have often been overlooked in the clutter of
international traffic-in their quest for businesslike privacy
conducive to getting the job done, they have slipped largely below
public consciousness, and the world has not fully appreciated their
contributions.
To date, the arms control negotiating states have been hesitant
about generating truly powerful global security organizations.
Despite recurrent plausible proposals, there is no public
international verification institute, equipped with its own state-of-
the-art satellites; there is no generic international inspection
agency, capable of mounting immediate on-site visits across a
spectrum of arms issues; and there is no standing global police
force, adjudicatory body, or criminal court that could readily redress
violations of the international law of arms control.
None of the existing arms control organizations come close to
possessing that degree of authority or perspective-none could
accomplish much on its own. All of the current generation of
institutions are but creatures of their respective national
109. The IAEA's safeguards regime has steadily improved over the years, but
questions remain regarding the system's capacity for timely detection of attempts to
divert nuclear materials from civilian to weapons applications. LAWRENCE
SCHEINMAN, THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY AND WORLD NUCLEAR
ORDER 225-41 (1987).
110. See Jon Wolfsthal, IAEA to Implement "Suspect Site""Inspection Powers, 22
ARMS CONTROL TODAY 27 (1992).
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governments, responsive to diverse political currents and national
control. But they do at least start the process of institutionalizing
arms control, making it a somewhat more predictable, routine part
of international law, less dependent upon episodic "spectactular
events" and less vulnerable to sudden perturbations.
V. CONCLUSION
Another common security misperception, comparable to the
mistake noted at the outset of this essay, is that the United States is,
in 1992, well positioned to assert a new kind of unilateral, self-
interested military, economic, and social leadership in the world. As
the sole remaining military superpower, America could perhaps
"throw its weight around," insisting upon reconfiguring
international affairs in a manner more conducive to pursuit of our
immediate commercial and other interests.1 11 No other country
would be able to out-muscle the United States, so a partial return to a
Hobbesian state of international nature might seem to work to the
advantage of the strongest, most determined player.11 2
This perspective, however, is fundamentally misguided. In fact,
the true comparative advantage for the United States, the area in
which we are most able to "play to our strengths," is precisely the
opposite. Even though the United States is now the planet's
dominant military power, our physical safety is far from
guaranteed, and we remain susceptible to a host of nuclear,
chemical, biological, and other attacks against which there is no
adequate defense. In the modern era of proliferating weapons of
mass destruction, all states share a common, inescapable
vulnerability, and traditional notions of rational deterrence become
less compelling.11 3
111. See Patrick E. Tyler, U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1992, at 1 (new Department of Defense policy statement advocates
measures to promote a world dominated by United States as sole military
superpower).
112. Ironically, the converse of this premise supports intensified interest in
multilateral disarmament, too. That is, one might start with the proposition that
domestic political and economic constraints will prevent the United States from
pursuing global military hegemony in the years ahead. In that situation, it would be
clearly advantageous to keep other states under controls, too, so that unilateral
disarmament does not undermine American security. See James Chace, The
Pentagon's Superpower Fantasy, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 16, 1992, at A17.
113. See Burns H. Weston, The Logic and Utility of a Lawful United States Foreign
Policy, 1 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1991) (articulating the rationale for
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America's real comparative advantage, in fact, lies with
invocation of law. We are the foremost maker of, and the foremost
beneficiary of, international law. We depend upon treaties, custom,
and international institutions more than any other country, and we
have the most to lose if these phenomena are undercut. We certainly
have more lawyers than any other society, and a greater familiarity
with the style and nuance of legal proceedings; if the world would
turn to judicial proceedings as the forum of choice for resolution of
conflict, it would promote our greatest relative assets. Our economic
prosperity, as well as our sheer physical safety, depend more than
ever upon the active cooperation of other states; the most effective
way to derive a mutually satisfactory, durable, and wise
accomodation of interests is for the United States to take the lead in
respecting and promoting international law.
Why, then, hasn't this happened? Why does the United States not
automatically adhere to international legal constraints with zeal and
rigor? Why do leaders persist in cynical, self-defeating behaviors,
failing to appreciate the better strategy? It is not simply
selfishness-this essay advocates following international law
precisely because it is in the selfish United States interest to do so.
My argument has proceeded from the basis of pragmatic appraisal
of national interests, not international charity.
The difficulty, I suggest, lies in the endemic inability or
unwillingness to look at the long term-to build a durable,
predictable structure enabling prudent, sustainable growth. It is
ignorance, not necessarily malevolence, that diverts us from
appreciation of our real interests. Political leaders, geared to the
timing of the next election cycle, calculate benefits for the short term
only, eschewing attention to true, enduring national values. Just as
society is only now beginning to appreciate the dynamics of global
environmentalism, similar principles ought to apply in the
international law of disarmament: crude, one-sided exploitation
cannot persist forever. In the long term we need to sustain our
international relations with dignity and husband our collective
resources with intelligence.
Sometimes, this strategy of taking law seriously will appear to
work to the short-run disadvantage of the United States, in foregoing
a material benefit that could be seized or retained through the threat
or use of brute force. There are many excesses that the United States
probably could "get away with," at least in the immediate term,
consistent United States adherence to international law); Thomas M. Franck, Taking
Treaties Seriously, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 67 (1988) (arguing for adherence to treaties as
promoting national interests).
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because no one, these days, is able to enforce many unwanted actions
upon the unwilling behemoth.
But in the long term such a strategy would be as unwise as it is
unjust. In the long term, the enlightened United States self interest
supports international law, builds it up as a meaningful factor in
global interaction, and submits willingly to it as a model for other
states to imitate. This is the more reliable mechanism for pursuing
national security in the modern era: working through international
law. This is the sound investment strategy: adhering to
international law not out of charity, but out of a pragmatic sense of
our more durable gains. In seeking to retard the proliferation of
weaponry, in disarmament matters more generally, and in other
international law topics across the board, the United States-and the
other players in the world community-need to learn to take
international law truly seriously.

